All things change in a dynamic environment. Your effort to remain what you are is what limits you.

Tuesday, May 18, 2010

Welcome to my blog!

This blog discusses everything from transhumanism to computational philosophy to cyberpunk themed music, movies, and games. For those of you who don't really know about such things, feel free to check out http://project.cyberpunk.ru/idb/index.html for more information. If you want to the gist of it, the community of transhumanists (known as H+) desire to make better use out of science and technologies in order to better mankind. The products of the movement often finds their way into everything from political issues to Hollywood blockbusters. If you have any comments or questions about anything related to futurism or transhumanism, or just want to discuss the cyberpunk counter-culture, just hit me up!

Is Technological Singularity a Feasible Notion

I've been thinking about this topic for some time and feel it is an interesting concept to discuss: Is technological singularity a potentially attainable reality, or will the global trend in technological development prevent such advancements from occurring? As of now, I've yet to develop a solid conclusion. While the current state of technology and overall intelligence prevents any individual from deriving a verdict on the issue, the notion of attaining a "self-improving" artificial intelligence is provocative to say the least. Many hard science fiction authors and cyberpunk aficionados claim TS is more than a simple pipe dream, and feel that the circumstances of such stories as 2001: A Space Odyssey, I, Robot, and The Matrix should be taken into consideration for future technological progression. Even intellectuals and scientists such as I.J. Good and Vernor Vinge have claimed that such advancements in AI are possible and indeed most probable. There exists just as much speculation however, as critics such as Hubert Dreyfus argue that present day computers lack many of the basic abilities which humans posses; an example being the ability to solve specific abstract algorithms (beyond using concepts such as heuristically guided searching), or non-formal problems which require insight and contextual understanding. While both schools of thought present strong arguments on the subject, it would be foolish to maintain a single-minded outlook. Keeping an open mind, especially when concerning technological progression, is key to the continued advancement of the human race. Thus, objectivity and optimism will have to do for now...

Thursday, April 10, 2008

The Subjectivity of Consciousness

In the eighth chapter of, The Problem With Consciousness, Colin McGinn addresses the notion of consciousness and discusses its relationship towards artefacts and organic entities. Being that the idea of consciousness is quite difficult to delineate and comprehend, he narrows the focus and concentrates primarily on the attribute of subjectivity. He argues that for a machine to obtain consciousness, it is necessary that mankind have a complete understanding for the human brain and the relationship between its activity and subsequent cognizance. For this reason, McGinn is hesitant to suggest that a conscious computer or machine could be constructed. While the technology and understanding for how to construct an extremely powerful computational machine is currently available, he argues that “knowing how to build a computing machine is not knowing how to build a conscious machine.”


McGinn's skepticism can be attributed to the notion that “consciousness is a computational property of the brain.” He feels that the brain's chemical makeup cannot be responsible for consciousness, because a chemical substance cannot exude a sense of subjectivity. Similarly, one of the arguments McGinn makes is that the “physical causes and effects cannot give rise to consciousness.” This statement is a criticism to the functionalist theory of the mind, and argues that the suggested properties are too unspecific to the brain. In other words, the properties that a functionalist claims are responsible for consciousness can be found in various other areas of the body, and therefore, are irrelevant to the subjectivity of the brain.


Another notion McGinn is critical of is computationalism. He feels the position that consciousness is directly related to cerebral computations, “cannot explain the existence of conscious subjectivity.” He argues that if computations can occur without realization, then consciousness cannot be solely defined through computational means. According to McGinn, if the computational approach towards consciousness is accurate, then mankind is currently capable of producing conscious mechanical entities. The reason for this is that present day machines are already built upon a foundation of computational properties; thus, if the human brain is simply a type of data processor, then mental attributes, such as subjectivity, can be likened to the programs and processes of a typical desktop computer. While McGinn concedes that an unknown level of computational complexity could still be the underlying factor in the reasons for human consciousness, he argues it is highly unlikely that cerebral computations form or define consciousness as a whole.


Throughout the chapter McGinn discusses and critiques the modern suggestions for what makes the human brain conscious. It is evident that in order to create a conscious machine, one must first understand such particularities. McGinn's criticisms of functionalism and computationalism are well founded, if not simply for the fact that such considerations have yet to produce a machine capable of subjectivity. In other words, basing a computational device such as a computer or robotic entity on the suggestions of such views would not produce a conscious being. For this reason, it can be argued that, at some level, such positions are erroneous in their descriptions of human consciousness, and therefore, McGinn is justified in his criticism.


It should be noted, however, that McGinn provides no statement in which he is critical of future development into artificial consciousness. In fact, his acceptance for the potentiality of conscious machines lies in a hybrid of functionalism and computationalism. This is evident in his suggestion that “supervenience assures us that the brain has some property which confers consciousness upon it.” The notion of functionalism or computationalism both suggest that something, whether it be a chemical property or calculation, is providing the basis behind the consciousness. Therefore, as the scientific community progresses to the point whereby they can fully replicate the human brain, it can be argued that consciousness would then transpire.


As previously stated, McGinn's examination and critique of functionalism and computationalism, as they relate to human consciousness, pertain only to the current availability of technical and cognitive information. What is important to notice, however, is that if mankind fails to completely grasp the reasons behind consciousness, then replicating it, even to the most minuscule of an extent, will remain an impossibility. Understanding the computational or functional aspects of consciousness is important, however as McGinn would argue, such components cannot be the sole factors in a subjective being. Thus, understanding the properties that are responsible for human consciousness is the most important question in the pursuit of a mechanized subjectivity.


The whole of McGinn's argument focuses on the capabilities and suggestions of modern day computer engineers and cognitive scientists, and explains how the machines and computers of today have no potential for attaining subjectivity. Likewise, the basis of his skepticism lies in mankind's current understanding, or lack thereof, concerning the property or properties responsible for creating consciousness. However, the underlying suggestion McGinn may be conveying is that mankind should focus on understanding itself before it attempts to replicate its consciousness in the form of artificial entities. While McGinn's argument throughout the chapter is skeptical of conscious machines, he provides no evidence that such a goal could not be realized in the near or distant future. If the “design feature” that makes the human brain conscious can be unveiled, then the realization of artificial consciousness can commence.

Thursday, March 13, 2008

Masamune, GITS, and the Evolution of Man

For decades, scientists have been working towards improving the abilities of artificial intelligence. Yet in spite of all the groundbreaking progress, they have yet to devise a machine capable of cognitive thought. In the realm of the entertainment industry, however, such creations have been successfully transcribed, illustrated, and animated. Books and movies about humanized A.I. are abundant in today’s media crazed world. One in particular focuses on a largely unvisited concept in hard science fiction stories: Masamune Shirow’s Ghost in the Shell. The story concentrates on a few general questions typical to the science fiction genre; specifically what it means to be human, the nature behind consciousness, and whether or not the mind is in fact a non-physical property. It diverges from the norm, however, in its argument that A.I. and the human mind should merge, and in turn be the next step in the evolution of man and machine.

Masamune tends to focus on philosophy and the socio-political implications of artificial intelligence and machines. Likewise, Ghost in the Shell presents many interesting notions that could potentially become a reality in the near future. The basis of the story focuses around Motoko Kusanagi, a cyber-augmented covert operations specialist, searching for her conscious identity amidst her complicated mechanized form. While the majority of the story focuses on the complexities of dualism and notions of the human psyche, the underlying idea that man can successfully fuse with machine provides some very interesting subject matter. Indeed, Masamune’s notion that “your effort to remain what you are is what limits you,” is itself worthy of further philosophical examination.

The majority of the individuals within the Ghost in the Shell universe have been completely outfitted and modified with cyber-augmented body parts. Furthermore, the creation known as a “cyberbrain” provides many interesting propositions for the future of neurotechnology. This improved brain operates much like a normal human brain, but has a near infinite memory and can communicate with other brains through a type of VPN in an efficient, real-time fashion. All of the augmented parts are made up of highly technical artificial intelligence capable of mimicking, and in fact, outperforming the parts they have replaced.

While such a concept is currently just a transhumanist’s pipe dream, the potential for something similar is in the foreseeable future. With the increase in micro-technology and a near global support for the research and development of nanotechnology, the notion of A.I. being interwoven within the human body is not so implausible. Once this happens, the argument that cognitive A.I. cannot exist will be null and void. The reason for this is that mankind, acting as host, will provide the thinking factor, while machine, being the augmentation, will provide the artificial factor. In essence, the individual would no longer correspond to the definition of human, but would act as the system which formulates the artificial intelligence into strong A.I. The result would not only be a conscious artificial intelligence, but the next step in the evolution of mankind.

This idea is something which Motoko struggles with throughout the story. She is constantly questioning her consciousness because of her hybridized genetic and organic makeup. She continues to rationalize her situation and questions the extent to which she is unique:

“There are countless ingredients that make up the human body and mind, like all the components that make up me as an individual with my own personality. Sure I have a face and voice to distinguish myself from others, but my thoughts and memories are unique only to me, and I carry a sense of my own destiny. Each of those things are just a small part of it. I collect information to use in my own way. All of that blends to create a mixture that forms me and gives rise to my conscience. I feel confined; only free to expand myself within boundaries.”

Masamune’s reasons for including such a significant amount of insecurity within his character may act as a preemptive response to future issues mankind could face should such radical changes come to fruition. In general, however, one can gather that the transhumanistic implications portrayed within Ghost in the Shell are largely beneficial. The physical advantages, such as increased longevity, durability, and capability, would account for an untold amount of progress in a very short amount of time. Similarly, the integration of computational devices within the brain would increase the rate of which mankind could think and communicate, thus allowing for improved decision making and reasoning skills.

As previously stated, many of the underlying factors in Masamune’s story have the potential for future realization. On the philosophical level, Ghost in the Shell provides many intriguing suggestions on the human condition and the philosophy of the mind. Masamune is careful to address the ramifications of misused artificial intelligence, but one can see real world examples where, if used properly, humanity would benefit. With the infusion of man and machine, a new chapter in the evolution of the human race would arise; for as Masamune’s masterpiece suggests, to be more than human is to truly be human.

Thursday, February 21, 2008

Cognitive Artificial Intelligence

The human beings' intrinsic ability to contemplate, understand, and communicate has perplexed cognitive scientists and theorists for centuries. In recent years, mankind has developed the tools and technologies necessary for simulating such abilities within computational programs. Many argue, however, that the true essence of cognitive thought has not been, and will never be artificially replicated. The primary basis for this argument lies in the nature of cognition; or the conditions necessary for an entity to be considered capable of thought. The modern belief that man will develop a machine which satisfies such conditions has lead many individuals to further contemplate the underlying principles of thought. For the purposes of this argument, I will consider the work of John R. Searle, and will present the factors I feel are necessary for cognitive thought to be realizable within artificial entities.


According to Searle, the creation of strong artificial intelligence, or rather, A.I. which equates or transcends human intelligence, is impossible. In his article, “Minds, Brains, and Programs,” Searle presents a number of assertions as to why strong A.I. is unattainable; the most notable being the Chinese Room argument. In this thought experiment, Searle demonstrates how a computational device lacks the ability to truly understand the logic behind its actions. It uses a series of rules in order to manipulate symbols, and the extent of its “thoughts” are no more than its ability to process a command according to its programing structure. Searle insists that, while a machine can be given the capacity to understand a particular item or subject, they are not themselves, capable of independent thought, (i.e., intentionality). In general, Searle's position on the cognitive possibilities of properly programmed computational devices is sound, and most of his supporting claims are well-founded. He does, however, lack a detailed account of the conditions necessary for artificially intelligent intentionality, and fails to address the many different forms of intelligence which exist.


The primary variable necessary for strong A.I., according to Searle, is understanding, or “the possession of mental (intentional) states.” However, his use of the word, “understanding,” is far too comprehensive. He is suggesting that an artificial intelligence must maintain the human mental states before it is considered capable of thought. While there is a definite requirement for a mental state, it is not necessary that they mirror those of the human being; e.g., beliefs or desires. In essence, an artificial intelligence needs only to indicate an ability to deviate between rational and irrational decisions before it can be considered a cognitive being. This ability, however, requires a few underlying essentials.


The first essential quality an artificial intelligence must acquire, before it can be viewed as a thinking entity, is the ability to demonstrate reason. This ability to make judgments is vital if the artificial intelligence is to exhibit any form of intelligence whatsoever. Within modern day computers and programs, this attribute has been somewhat established. The computers ability to defeat chess masters, calculate enormous equations and their subsequent solutions, and adhere to a countless series of if/then commands demonstrates, to an extent, the A.I.'s ability to reason. This, however, is only one of the conditions necessary to satisfy the intelligence question. The second quality is the ability to acquire new information. While some may contend an artificial intelligence cannot learn, it can be argued that learning, at its core, is no more then the absorption and retention of information. Through this definition, computers are already capable of learning at an increasingly fast rate, and thus, have satisfied the second requirement. Analogous to the ability to learn, however, is the notion of understanding.


As previously stated, Searle's definition and usage of understanding is not necessary for an artificial intelligence to be considered a thinking entity. What is necessary, however, is the A.I.'s ability to indicate the reason behind its reasoning. The third quality, to put it simply, is that the computer must be able to provide the logic behind its knowledge and decisions. This is perhaps the most important aspect of the intelligent entity, but is something which has yet to be developed within artificial intelligence. In the human model of cognition, it is vital to grasp both the fundamental and contextual aspects of a particular subject during the learning process. If one fails to do so, they are less likely to retain the knowledge; if one succeeds, they are more likely to understand the knowledge. However, in the computer model, the system has the ability to maintain information and knowledge indefinitely. For this reason, humans have largely consider computers to be nothing more then storage devices. If the computer has the ability to supply the reasoning behind its knowledge and resulting decisions, however, it can then be considered something greater.

Similar to a human being, the artificial intelligence can only exist as an intelligent entity if it maintains specific functionalities. For decades, mankind has imagined creating an intelligent being capable of reflecting the structure and rationale of human cognition. With the rise of computers and functional artificial intelligence, many individuals feel mankind is closer than ever to attaining this reality. However, with technological and scientific capabilities where they currently are, such a goal is highly unlikely. If mankind wishes to create another intelligent being, it need not pattern it off the totality of the human model. The metal state of the human being is simply too complex to replicate at this time. Instead, those in pursuit of such goals should focus on replicating the most simple and essential mental states which makes mankind conscious, and thus intelligent entities.

Tuesday, January 15, 2008